Summaries of opinions issued between March 9 and 31, 2026

Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers lacked probable cause to arrest McGee because the description used to arrest him in a large park frequented by many people at 5 pm lacked sufficient specificity to identify him as the suspect.

In an interlocutory appeal filed by the government, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order suppressing evidence. There was no Miranda violation because Torres did not unambiguously invoke his right to remain silent, and his subsequent waiver was not involuntary. Further, Torres’s statements were not constitutionally involuntary because his will was not overborn by police coercion.

Under section 16-8-107(3)(b), “the defendant is not permitted to introduce evidence . . . concerning the defendant’s mental condition . . . without having undergone a court-ordered examination pursuant to section 16-8-106.” However, a defendant must be competent before undergoing a mental condition examination under § 16-8-107(3)(b). Here, CMHHIP attempted a mental condition examination while Day was incompetent. Therefore, the trial court erred by blaming Day’s noncooperation while she was incompetent for the failure to complete the mental condition examination. Before the retrial, the trial court should reassess whether any portions of Dr. Fukutaki’s testimony are inadmissible.

The legal issue in this opinion is not noteworthy: the trial court erred by suppressing Lulei’s statements based on an Edwards violation (failure to scrupulously honor Lulei’s invocation of counsel) because Lulei was not in custody at that time and the protections of Miranda (and therefor Edwards) only apply to people who are in custody. What is deeply troubling is the majority’s willingness to reach the issue even though the AG raised it for the very first time at oral argument.

While it might be a good idea, there is no requirement that a Bergerud hearing must be conducted by a judge other than the one presiding over the case.

Issue #1: Although the sales price of the items stolen totaled $1,856.19, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Bolden was guilty of stealing items with a total value between $2,000 and $5,000 because the manager testified that the regular ticket price of the items was $2,094.98. Issue #2: The trial court did not err in rejecting Bolden’s proposed instructions informing the jury that their determination of value should not be based on speculation or conjecture. Issue #3: The trial court did not err in rejecting Bolden’s proposed instructions informing the jury that value should be based on the reasonable market value of the items, and that the reasonable market value is the amount a willing buyer would pay for the items at the time of the theft.

A defendant can voluntarily waive the statutory right to presentence confinement credit (PSCC): which is what occurred here. As such, the mittimus needed to be amended to reflect that Endsley was not entitled to any PSCC because he waived it as part of his plea agreement.

The trial court failed to make a subsection (1)(b) compliant order indicating Schreiner was liable for restitution before or during the sentencing hearing. Consistent with Snow, the district court’s error must be remedied by vacating the untimely post-sentencing restitution order and remanding the case for entry of a subsection (1)(d) order that Schreiner owes no restitution.

The division found there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding of serious bodily injury because the ER doctor’s testimony that a hematoma can cause damage to facial nerves only identified a risk generally associated with the type of injury the victim sustained, rather than a risk associated with the victim’s actual injury.

In a pretrial hearing, the district court dismissed the charge of retaliation against a judge finding, as a matter of law, that the government could not establish that Hernandez had some subjective understanding of the threatening nature of her statements to Judge May. The division affirms.

Peschong was one of four occupants in a car pulled over by law enforcement who later searched the car and found a large quantity of drugs in an opaque, closed bag on the rear seat floorboards close to where Peschong had been sitting. He was convicted of possession with intent to distribute the drugs. The division reversed finding the evidence was insufficient in both quantity and quality to establish knowing possession.

Pleading guilty does not bar a section 1983 lawsuit where the relief sought is purely prospective—an injunction stopping officials from enforcing an ordinance in the future.