June 5, 2026 Case Summaries

Let the pretrial bond revolution commence! By maintaining a $5 million cash only bond for a person charged with first degree murder after Smith but before Amendment I went into effect, the district court (1) misapplied the law by incorrectly assuming the intent of a prospective constitutional amendment contrary to its plain language; (2) set the bond amount arbitrarily based on that intent; and (3) failed to make necessary factual findings supported by the record. Although the division rejected the “attainability requirement” argument, I link materials relating to the California Supreme Court’s acceptance of the argument so you can pursue it further in Colorado.

The district court properly denied Gotorff’s habeas petitions since the claims raised therein have already been reviewed and ruled on or are more appropriately resolved in his pending direct appeal. The trial court should not have ordered him to pay filing fees under section 13-17.5-103(1) since a “‘civil action’ does not include . . . an action for habeas corpus” for purposes of Title 17.5. § 13-17.5-102(1).

The Safe2Tell anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated to establish reasonable suspicion and justify the school principal’s search of T.J.W.’s backpack.

The initial “protective sweep” of the passenger compartment was justified because the officers had a reasonable belief that Baker was armed and dangerous based on the occupants’ furtive movements, Baker’s recent arrest for POWPO, and the “high crime” nature of the neighborhood. Once the officers found a gun, the resulting car search was justified under the automobile exception.

Under the plain and unambiguous language of section 19-2.5-305(4)(g), Lawrence was properly transferred from DYS custody to the county jail when he turned eighteen. This result did not create an equal protection violation even though another person with a worse criminal history was statutorily allowed to stay in DYS custody after turning 18.

Cooper, one of two paramedics involved in the murder of Elijah McClain, was convicted of criminally negligent homicide. Issue #1: Section 24-31-101(1)(b) provided the Attorney General’s authority to prosecute the case. Issue #2: The trial court improperly instructed the jury that the applicable standard of care was a “reasonable person” and not a “reasonable paramedic in Aurora Colorado.” The court also erred in failing to adequately clarify the jurors' confusion on this issue. They reversed because the errors were not harmless. Issue #3: For the crime of criminally negligent homicide, subsection (1)(e)(II) of the special relationships statute creates a traverse. As such, the trial court did not err in rejecting Cooper’s affirmative defense instruction.

Cichuniec, one of two paramedics involved in the murder of Elijah McClain, was convicted of criminally negligent homicide. Issue #1: Section 24-31-101(1)(b) provided the Attorney General’s authority to prosecute the case. Issue #2: (Not argued in Cooper) The yellow sticky notes on the court calendar indicating that the court was closed between December 25 and 29 were not “extraneous prejudicial information” that could be considered in a motion for new trial. Issue #3: (Not argued in Cooper) The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict on criminally negligent homicide under either a complicity or principal theory. Issue #4: The trial court improperly instructed the jury that the applicable standard of care was a “reasonable person” and not a “reasonable paramedic in Aurora Colorado.” The court also erred in failing to adequately clarify the jurors' confusion on this issue. They reversed because the error wasn’t harmless. Issue #5: For the crime of criminally negligent homicide, subsection (1)(e)(II) of the special relationships statute creates a traverse. As such, the trial court did not err in rejecting Cichuniec’s affirmative defense instruction. Issue #6: The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict for second degree assault (unlawful administration of drugs). Issue #7: In the context of complicitor culpability, the prosecution’s burden of proving that another person committed the offense requires only proof that the principal committed the statutory elements of the offense. As such, the district court did not err by failing to instruct the jury that, in addition to proving Cooper’s (the principal’s) commission of the elements of second degree assault (unlawful administration of drugs), the prosecution was also required to prove that the special relationship affirmative defense wasn’t applicable to Cooper’s conduct. Issue #8: The prosecution’s experts did not usurp the jury’s role by testifying that there was no medical or therapeutic reason to administer ketamine to McClain.

To be convicted of impersonating a peace officer, a person must falsely pretend to be a police officer and, in that pretend capacity, commit some act. In this context, the act can be a verbal statement encouraging another person to act.

In this dependency and neglect appeal, a division of the Court of Appeals considers whether a guardian ad litem (GAL) has standing to file a motion to terminate parental rights. The division concludes that a GAL has standing because (1) People in Interest of R.M.P., 2025 CO 34, applies only to the first, or adjudicatory, phase of a dependency or neglect proceeding and not to the second, or dispositional, phase of a dependency or neglect proceeding; and (2) the GAL is acting under their independent statutory charge to advocate for the child’s best interests.

After a prosecutor asserts race-neutral reasons for a peremptory strike, defense counsel must at least have an opportunity to argue that the asserted race-neutral reasons were pretextual. Here, whether due to confusion, oversight, an overly hurried jury selection process, or some other cause, things broke down, and the ordinary trial-court procedure for resolving Batson claims at step three never occurred— notwithstanding the repeated efforts of Pitchford’s counsel to pursue and preserve the Batson objection. Even under the AEDPA standard, the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the clearly established Batson precedents and unreasonably determined that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s asserted race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes of four black prospective jurors.

Per Curiam opinion GVRing the 11th Circuit because the court used post-trial evidence indicative of guilt to conclude that there wasn’t a reasonable probability that the Giglio error affected the jury’s verdict.