June 19, 2026 Case Summaries

A knowingly and voluntarily obtained appeal waiver is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice. While this ruling is narrow in scope, the special concurrence by three Justices indicates that this is just “a start,” and that the Court may take a more active role in limiting prosecutorial abuses in the plea-bargaining process. Also, the government did not waive or forfeit its appeal waiver argument by not objecting when, after imposing the sentence, the court informed Hunter that he could appeal.

The government’s prosecution of Mr. Hemani under §922(g)(3) based solely on his admitted use of marijuana about every other day while having a gun in his home, violated the Second Amendment.

When private counsel files a postconviction motion pursuant to Rule 35(c)(2) and requests that the court appoint counsel and allow private counsel to withdraw, if the PC court does not summarily deny the motion under 35(c)(3)(IV), it should serve a copy on the prosecution and “direct the prosecution to respond to the defendant’s claims or request additional time to respond.” What happens after that remains a mystery.

Simms appealed the jury’s conviction for felony menacing. Issue #1: Judge Moultrie and Judge Bernard agree that the trial court didn’t err by instructing the jury using the 2022 model jury instruction on reasonable doubt. Judge Taubman dissented because he would find the inclusion of the “real possibility” language in that instruction impermissibly lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof. Issue #2: During deliberations, the jury asked, “Can a fist be considered a bludgeon?” which was awkward for the prosecution that had maintained Simms committed felony menacing with a knife. The judge refused to provide any further definition and told the jurors to give words their plain and ordinary meaning. All three judges agreed that the word “bludgeon,” as used in the felony menacing statute, does not include a fist. Judge Moultrie and Judge Taubman found the trial court’s response was inadequate because the plain and ordinary meaning of the word bludgeon is ambiguous, the judge should have clarified the ambiguity by instructing the jury that a fist cannot be considered a bludgeon. The failure to do so meant that the jury could have convicted Simms even though a fist is not included in the statutory definition. Judge Bernard disagreed because the plain and ordinary meaning of a bludgeon is not ambiguous and does not include a fist. Therefore, the trial court properly answered the juror’s question by telling them to give words their plain and ordinary meaning. Issue #3: All three judges agreed that the court’s award of restitution must be vacated because it’s unclear whether the award was predicated on Simms’s felony menacing conviction (which was reversed), Simms’s misdemeanor convictions (which he didn’t contest on appeal), or some combination thereof. And because the issue may arise on remand, the division reminded the trial court that it may not apply the rebuttable presumption of causation unless the prosecution satisfies section 18-1.3-603(10)(b)’s requirements and must otherwise hold the prosecution to its burden of proving that the amount of assistance the CVCB provided was attributable to Simms’s conduct.