JDR Commentary on April 2026 Colorado Opinions

The trial court erred by denying a challenge for cause to a juror whose son-in-law worked in the DA’s office prosecuting Stauch. Although defense counsel did not use a peremptory challenge to strike the juror, the defense did not waive or invite the error, and reversal was required because the juror sat on the panel that convicted Stauch.

Because the DA’s argument that their interlocutory appeal was authorized by the law lacked arguable merit, the government’s appeal did not toll the speedy trial statute. Since the trial occurred after the speedy trial deadline lapsed, the convictions must be vacated and the charges dismissed.

Assuming the prosecution’s expert’s testimony (that she did not see any signs that the children had been coached) was inadmissible vouching testimony, there was no error because the defense opened the door to the testimony by repeatedly suggesting to the jury—through both the introduction of evidence and the presentation of argument—that the children had been coached or otherwise improperly influenced by their maternal grandmother because she wanted to maintain custody of them.

Where a defendant is accused of assaulting an EMT and raises self-defense, the trial court should provide an instruction that helps the jury assess whether the EMT was engaged in a “lawful duty” or otherwise was using lawful force.

The district court incorrectly designated Zuniga an SVP because there was no evidence that he promoted a relationship with A.Z. for the purpose of sexually victimizing her.

A defendant must be permitted to cross-examine a prosecution witness about pending criminal charges when the charges are in the same judicial district in which the defendant was being prosecuted. Nothing new here, just a nice reminder of the holding in People v. Reynolds-Wynn, 2024 COA.

The magistrate correctly granted an MJA where the prosecution failed to present any evidence that B.D.R.’s actions were “for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.” Again, no new law here, just a nice reminder of People in Interest of J.O., 2022 COA 65M.

In a second degree assault prosecution for allegedly throwing feces on an officer with the intent to infect, injure or harm the officer, the district court reversibly erred under Plemmons I, by failing to define “harm” in the jury instructions. Based on Plemmons II which was decided after Aragon’s trial but is the current law articulating the standard for how “harm” should be defined there was sufficient evidence to support Aragon’s conviction.

The trial court did not err in determining, after an extended proportionality review hearing, that Clark’s LWOP sentence for first degree kidnapping was not grossly disproportionate.