Case Summaries

The defense served CBI with a Rule 17 SDT to get information related to CBI’s green-lighting of Missy Woods’ misconduct. CBI moved to quash, and the trial court denied the motion to quash. CBI filed a Rule 21 petition. The Court found the district court erred in its analysis and remanded for a do-over with further guidance based on its judicial gloss on Rule 17 and the new FSIA provision.

The trial court erred by excluding Nguyen’s expert’s testimony that Nguyen suffered from PTSD. In a case where the only real dispute concerned Nguyen’s mental state, the error violated Nguyen’s constitutional right to present a complete defense. The government failed to carry its burden to prove the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and reversal was required.

During voir dire, a juror stated she could not be fair because of the trauma she experienced from being a crime victim. Ritchie challenged the juror for cause. The prosecutor objected because she remembered the juror stating she could be fair and impartial. The judge sided with the prosecutor and denied the challenge for cause. In so doing, the trial court reversibly erred because no one rehabilitated the juror and the juror never stated that she could be fair and impartial. Because the juror sat on the panel that convicted Ritchie, reversal was required.

Issue #1: The district court erred by summarily denying Martinez’s claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by misadvising him on how much time he would serve if he accepted the prosecution’s 50-year plea offer, causing him to reject a plea offer he otherwise would have accepted. As such, they remanded for a hearing on this claim. Issue #2: Martinez’s request for a proportionality review of his F1 kidnapping LWOP sentence was barred as successive since it could have been raised as plain error on direct appeal.

This is a good reminder that when conducting an extended proportionality review analysis, the second portion requires the trial court to compare the sentencing consequences in other jurisdictions – that is, jurisdictions other than Colorado (i.e., other states)– NOT other jurisdictions inside of Colorado (i.e., counties).

Issue #1: The Supreme Court refused to address the order suppressing the identification by Black. Issue #2: Taking Vanpelt’s gun was perfectly OK because the officers believed Vanpelt might become violent after being woken up from a drunken stupor. Issue #3: The Court did not review Judge Cure’s decision that the Miranda advisement was inadequate. Issue #4: Vanpelt’s statements were not constitutionally involuntary.

SCOTUS denied cert but Justices Sotomayor and Gorsuch wrote a mini-opinion pointing out the Double Jeopardy problem associated with the government prosecuting a person multiple times for being present continuously in the U.S. following removal.

Erlinger announced a “new” rule of constitutional law and, therefore, does not apply on collateral review.

In a § 1152 prosecution where the victim is an Indian, the defendant’s Indian status is an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional element. Therefore, the defendant has the burden of production and persuasion to establish their Indian status.

Ha! I was right. Or at least one federal judge thinks so. Chatrie (coupled with Carpenter) changed the Fourth Amendment landscape. A search occurs when a police officer rummages location history accumulated through FLOCK or other automatic license plate reader (ALPR) technology. Granted, this is a district court order suppressing evidence and not an opinion by the Tenth Circuit – “But it’s a start.” Oh. And for good measure, ignoring the ALPR issue, the judge found the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to investigate drug trafficking after the traffic stop concluded. Two good grounds for suppression! Hopefully, the Tenth Circuit doesn’t change this result. Fair warning, the full summary is really long – even by my current standards. Settle in with a Friday afternoon beverage of choice and enjoy some good news.

The trial court reversibly erred by improperly instructing the jury on the correct mental state for attempted first-degree murder.

The prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Fregosi caused over $2,000 of damage by kicking the victim’s car after a terrible, horrible, no good first date.

The district court properly dismissed two counts of felony motor vehicular theft because the prosecution presented insufficient evidence of identification at the preliminary hearing.

In a hit and run prosecution, no one paid attention to the insurance charge, and in the resulting mess, the prosecution failed to prove either the insurance offense they charged or the insurance offense on which the jury returned a guilty verdict. The lessons to be learned here might be employed in other hit and run cases to eject an insurance charge at MJA.

The judge exceeded the authority granted by 18-1-1001 by precluding Zanella from having any contact with anyone under the age of eighteen who was not a witness or victim of the crimes.