August 7, 2026 Case Summaries

The victim’s unsupported testimony that Fonseca punched her several times was enough to support the third-degree assault conviction. Despite the parties’ characterization of their relationship as not boyfriend and girlfriend, not being a “couple,” and not dating exclusively, the evidence was sufficient to establish an intimate relationship for purposes of the DV tag. The prosecutor’s closing arguments did not amount to misconduct.

While this is a civil matter unlikely to concern your criminal law practice, there is a good discussion of “excusable neglect” that you might find helpful in litigating untimely 35(c)(2) claims. On August 3, 2026, the Court made minor modifications to this opinion. Not enough to do another summary. But enough that I could not completely ignore it. Essentially cleaning up the procedural aspects for the standard of review. What was: ¶20 Whether a defaulting party’s testimony is admissible in a non-defaulting defendant’s trial and whether a defaulting defendant is entitled to judgment in his favor to avoid inconsistent adjudications are questions of law, which we review de novo. See Dickinson v. Lincoln Bldg. Corp., 2015 COA 170M, ¶ 21, 378 P.3d 797, 804. What is: ¶20 But here, we must first consider whether a defaulting party’s testimony may be admissible in a non-defaulting defendant’s trial and whether a defaulting defendant may be entitled to judgment in his favor to avoid inconsistent adjudications, which are questions of law that we review de novo. See Dickinson v. Lincoln Bldg. Corp., 2015 COA 170M, ¶ 21, 378 P.3d 797, 804. If we answer these threshold legal questions in the affirmative, we then review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s more fact-driven decision regarding whether to permit a witness to testify or to enter judgment in favor of a defaulting defendant.

The sentencing court failed to enter an order, at or before sentencing, addressing restitution that was compliant with section 18-1.3-603(1). This resulted in an illegal sentence – one that was not authorized by law. As such, the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s 35(a) motion as an untimely unlawful manner claim. The only appropriate remedy is to enter an order under 18-1.3-603(1)(d) that Urzua-Hernandez does not owe any restitution.

The district court vacated an Aurora Municipal Court conviction for Motor Vehicle Theft, finding that the code now intrudes into the land of felonies that is preempted by state law. Said differently, controlling Motor Vehicle Theft is a mixed matter of state and local concern, and there was an operational conflict because the municipal conviction allows for something (misdemeanor conviction) that the state provision forbids (felony only).

Regulating juvenile handgun possession fits nicely within Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.

In case of emergency, break the glass and reach for the writ of coram nobis to avoid a miscarriage of justice.