May 29, 2026 Case Summaries

After the board revokes a person’s parole, the person must pursue and lose their administrative appeal pursuant to Section 17-2-103 and 17-2-201 before seeking judicial relief under Rule 35(c)(2)(VII).

The City can be sued where a traffic light creates “conflicting directions” that lead to an accident. Here the light created conflicting directions because one side was inoperable (no color illuminated) while the perpendicular light was illuminated green. This “vexing situation” makes it very difficult for drivers, like Sandoval, to predict the conduct of other drivers in the cross-traffic, and creates a dangerous condition that cannot be navigated through the proper interpretation of the traffic laws.

In a non-precedential order resolving a Rule 21 proceeding (that I missed back in February), the Court concludes that a defendant who endorses a cold expert to testify about child psychology, child-to-parent violence, abuse of caretakers, and family dynamics must comply with the notice and evaluation requirements in section 16-8-107(3)(b).

Issue #1: The statutory protections of Section 18-1.3-603(8) prohibiting a court from imposing restitution for damages covered by insurance only apply to restitution orders relating to non-felony convictions under title 42. Here, Marceleno damaged a car during the commission of felony offenses. As such, the district court properly assessed the full amount of restitution for the damaged car because Marceleno failed to establish that the damage was covered by an insurance policy. Issue #2: The district court properly assessed restitution for the damage he caused when he crashed the stolen car into a gate guarding a community.

Under section 24-72-705(1)(a)(II), a court “shall” seal criminal justice records where the defendant is “acquitted” of all counts. Under long-standing precedent, “acquittal” includes an NGRI determination. As such, the trial court erred by denying J.P.s petition to seal his three old cases because he was found to be NGRI.

Issue #1: When a plaintiff seeks damages under section 13- 21-131 for a violation of Colorado’s due process clause based on a jail suicide, the plaintiff must show that the jailer or their supervisor acted with deliberate indifference. Applying that standard, the division concludes that plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts demonstrating that any defendant acted with deliberate indifference. Issue #2: A jailer has a duty to protect a detainee from self-inflicted injury or death only if the risk of such harm is reasonably foreseeable. Because plaintiff’s allegations didn’t satisfy this standard, the division affirms the dismissal of her wrongful death claim. Issue #3: No appellate attorney fees for the defendants because they could not be bothered to explain why an award of fees was justifiable.

The district court failed to enter one of the four required restitution orders at sentencing. As such, they remanded for entry of an order under section 18-1.3-603(1)(d) that he is not liable to pay any restitution.

The trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on Gallegos’ defense of a third person affirmative defense impermissibly lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof for the first degree assault charge, and likely substantially influenced the remaining verdicts.

The district court reversibly erred by instructing the jury that a trespasser who is subject to lawful physical force has no privilege to use physical force in self-defense because it removed from the jury’s consideration whether Banks reasonably believed he was facing unlawful force.

This is a civil matter that is unlikely to interest you. I chose to put this in the materials only because SCOTUS relies on the Party Presentation Principle to reach its decision. And I like the Party Presentation Principle since our state court judges like to sally forth correcting perceived wrongs even when the prosecution does not raise the issues.

Fernandez filed a petition seeking compassionate release under §3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that his possible innocence constituted the “extraordinary and compelling circumstances” statutorily required to grant relief. The district court agreed. After the Second Circuit reversed, SCOTUS took this case as a vehicle to address a circuit split. The majority creates a categorical rule that any reason that “collaterally attacks the validity” of the prisoner’s conviction cannot be considered as an “extraordinary and compelling” circumstance justifying compassionate release.

When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive—as with the change to §924(c)—the resulting sentencing disparity cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason that warrants a sentence reduction under 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i).